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WHO BENEFITS FROM ZERO-RATINGS? A BRIEF NOTE ON THE
SOUTH AFRICAN VAT SYSTEM
SEBASTIAN BEER AND MATTHIAS KASPER
1. Introduction
Twenty years after overcoming Apartheid, South Africa still suffers from poverty and
inequality. Recent data (Income and Expenditure Survey 2011) indicates that one third
of the population lives on less than USD 0.70 per day while the upper tercile has USD
28 available. The country also faces other complex challenges, including high levels of
unemployment, a resource-biased economy and low levels of education, and structural
reforms are much needed to put the economy on a path of sustained growth. However,
structural reforms require a broad consent within society, and inequality, clearly, is a major
hindrance to this.
By choosing how to collect revenue and how to spend it, South Africa’s government has
two instruments at their disposal in order to alleviate inequality and facilitate reform. Like
most modern economies, South Africa is increasingly relying on indirect taxation. The
combined revenue generated by VAT, excise taxes, and the fuel and gas levy, make up 35%
of total revenue. In the light of growing income inequality, this development is remarkable
as wealthy individuals tend to spend a smaller proportion of their income on consumption.
Indirect taxation thus potentially places a relatively higher burden on the poor.1
To counteract an aggravation of income inequality, a range of commodities, held to be
important for the poor, are currently zero-rated under South Africa’s VAT system.2 And
some studies find that this policy measure is partly effective in reducing the regressive effect
(Fourie and Owen, 1993; Jansen et al., 2012). However, while studies on the regressive effect
of VAT are potentially valuable, they are certainly non-conclusive in appraising the welfare
consequences of zero-ratings. Increasing the rates on such commodities would not only
entail an increased burden on the poor, but also an increase in governmental revenues.
Depending on the redistribution of such additional revenues, the poor could either benefit
or not from this reform and the conclusion would be fairly independent from the overall
regressiveness of the system.
1Go, Kearney, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2005) indeed confirm a mildly regressive effect of South Africa’s
VAT.
2Producers of exempt commodities are not required to collect output tax, nor are they eligible for refunds.
Input VAT thus sticks to them and increases their marginal costs of production. This leads to a cascading
of taxes – even under VAT systems (see Keen, 2013, for a more detailed discussion). Zero-rating, on the
other hand, does not introduce distortions of this kind since input taxes paid by VAT-registered sellers are
fully recovered.
1
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In this paper, we re-evaluate the effectiveness of zero-rating as a measure to alleviate
poverty in South Africa and extend earlier work by incorporating both sides of fiscal action
in our analysis. We clarify the interlink between welfare effects and consumption taxation
by retracing a simple model developed by Keen (2013), in Section 2, which we then apply
to the South African case. In doing so, we employ data from the most recent Income
and Expenditure survey to derive distributions of household spending and governmental
spending in Section 3. We conclude in Section 4.
2. The effect of changing the tax on some commodity
In this section we briefly discuss the welfare effects of a partial, non revenue neutral, tax
reform.3 We assume that producer prices are fixed and only a fraction αij of household i’s
consumption of commodity j is purchased from VAT-registered retailers. Furthermore, we
expect that this fraction is increasing with income. One rationale for the latter assumption
is that high-income households, having higher opportunity costs of time, prefer to purchase
their consumption items in bulk at sufficiently large (VAT-registered) retail stores.4
We hypothesize that zero-rating of commodities originates from a concern for equity and
evaluate a proposed reform accordingly. The most simple example of social preferences
reflecting such a concern are Rawlsian, where the welfare of the poorest serves as the
benchmark.
If the tax on some zero-rated commodity, say xk, is slightly raised, the utility of the
poorest is perturbed for two reasons: First, a fraction of income is lost on tax; clearly
having a negative impact on well-being. Second, the reform leads to an increase in revenue
and thus public spending, whose size is conditional upon the consumption level of that
commodity prior to reform (the direct revenue effect) as well as the behavioral response in
consumption patterns (the indirect revenue effect). If the valuation of increased spending
exceeds the negative income effect, the poorest would prefer to raise a small tax on a
zero-rated commodity.
In order to gain some intuition for the above mentioned, neglect for the moment the
indirect revenue effect and consider the case where public revenue is uniformly distributed
across all households in the form of lump-sum transfers. Disregarding that small retailers
are exempt from VAT, a marginal increase in the tax rate on commodity k, say dτk, would
increase public revenue by dG = dτ
∑
xik, where
∑
xik is the total amount of good k
consumed prior to reform. Since nothing is wasted in this simple setup, the government
distributes dG/H to each household, where H is the number of households. Thus, the
poorest would profit if
3We derive the main result, condition (2), in the Appendix and follow Keen (2013) closely in doing so.
4The South African VAT system allows voluntary registration for businesses earning more than R 50.000
per year. Vendors generating annual turnovers of more than R 1 million, however, are obliged to register
(Roeleveld et al., 2012).
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xpk <
1
H
H∑
i=1
xik.(1)
That is, income lost due to taxation is more than compensated by additionally received
governmental spending. Note that this condition holds for all normal goods; that is goods
whose consumption is increasing with income. Clearly, most of the assumption involved in
this special case are not likely to hold.
The more general condition for the poorest to profit from a marginal increase in the tax
rate τk is
x˜pk
φp
< sp
H∑
i=1
x˜ik
1 + δ
1− γ ,(2)
where x˜ij = α
i
jx
i
j is the share of consumption of commodity j purchased at VAT-registered
retailers, φp is the marginal valuation of public spending in terms of income, sp measures
the fraction of public spending that is allocated to the poorest, δ gives the (weighted)
indirect revenue effect of a shift in consumption patterns that is caused by a change in
relative prices and γ reflects the indirect revenue effect of a shift in consumption that is
due to an increase in public spending.5
While we will use data of the National Income and Expenditure survey, in the next
section, to estimate some of the parameters in (2), we may only hypothesize about the
potential role of others. Begin with the valuation of public spending. Most revenue is not
distributed in the form of lump-sum transfers, and other distribution mechanisms might
both slacken or tighten the condition in (1) to the extent that φ becomes smaller or bigger
than one. The free provision of electricity, for instance, serves a need for security and might
thus be valued, by most members of society, above its marginal costs of production. The
benefit of public education, on the other hand, certainly depends on household character-
istics and might be below its cash-equivalent for the poorest. In the empirical section, we
take φ = 1 as a benchmark and note that this may be regarded a lower bound if public
spending is targeted to serve the most basic needs.
To understand the role of the indirect revenue effect, assume, until further notice, that
all cross-price elasticities are zero, so that changing the price of one commodity does not
affect the demand for another. The indirect revenue effect than reduces to 1/(1 − γ) and
behavioural consequences for revenue are limited to the effect a changed provision of public
goods has on individual demands.
5Substituting the assumption that indirect revenue effects cancel out, (1 + δ)/(1− γ) = 1, that revenue
is distributed uniformly sp = 1/H in the form of lump-sum transfers, φi = 1, and disregarding VAT
exemptions x˜ = x, gives expression (1) above.
4 SEBASTIAN BEER AND MATTHIAS KASPER
If governmental spending comes in a form that is complementary to consumption, like
lump-sum transfers possibly are, γ is positive6 and revenue collections will exceed the me-
chanical increase due to changing the tax on some fixed amount of consumption. However,
increased spending might also trigger substitution effects, decrease private consumption,
and imply that overall less tax is collected. The second (indirect) cause for the change in
revenue collections, cross-price elasticities, may as well both slacken or tighten the con-
dition in (1). Their effect on governmental revenue will be the more beneficial, the less
complementary the newly taxed commodity is to economy-wide consumption; implying
δ > 0.
Most of South Africa’s zero-rated products are basic food items, such as bread or rice,
fruits, or vegetables. Cross-price elasticities within this group are immaterial for revenue
collections as no tax was collected before the reform. However, the judgement whether
vegetables, for example, are regarded as substitutable, or as an indispensable ingredient of
a meal, most likely differs across households and ultimately determines the overall revenue
effect the taxation of vegetables had. In the empirical section we will consider neutral,
positive and negative indirect revenue effects.
3. Empirical evaluation of zero ratings
In the following, we evaluate the effect a marginal tax reform had on the well-being of
an income decile by employing data of the Income and Expenditure Survey 2011 (IES).7
We will consider if the welfare measure
W (Γ, sj) ≡ Γsj
H∑
i=1
αixik − αjxjk,(3)
where Γ subsumes the indirect revenue effect, is positive for the j’th income decile. If it
is, the decile under consideration would be better off if the corresponding tax was slightly
raised. In particular, we are interested to uncover the beneficiaries from taxing commodities
that are currently zero-rate in the South African VAT-system.
While information of consumption spending in the formal sector (αixik) is immediately
available from the survey, we have to estimate the fraction of public spending that is
allocated to the j’th income decile (sj) and do so in section 3.1. As we lack information to
estimate cross price-elasticities and the effect public provision has on consumer demand,
we analyse the proposed reform for three indirect revenue effects: that each unit of tax
additionally imposed, increases governmental revenue by 0.8, 1, or 1.2 units; that is we
evaluate reform for Γ ∈ {0.8, 1, 1.2}. Section 3.2 present the results.
6Note that δ is strictly smaller than one, given that governmental spending can not finance itself; that
is ∂G(τ,G)/∂G < 1.
7The Income and Expenditure Survey 2011 was conducted by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) and
provides detailed information on expenditure and income components of South African households. A total
of 25,823 households was required to complete their daily acquisitions in diaries (provided by Stats SA) for
two weeks and to answer a variety of questions over a four week period. Using information on the latest
Census (2001), the survey sample was weighted to be representative for the South African population.
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3.1. Discussion of public spending and its allocation to income deciles. Govern-
mental spending may be categorised in, at least, two broad groups. Spending which is
not targeted, but rather necessary to run the state, and whose consumption is not rivalry
nor exclusive. Military expenses and debt-service are prime examples in this group which
should contribute, in principle, to the use of all members of society in the same way. The
second category subsumes spending which is, in contrast, not enjoyed equi-proportionally;
either due to its exclusive design (e.g. child-care grants) or because its value is contingent
upon household characteristics (cars, for instance, are necessary to enjoy governmental
spending on roads).
The IES may only be used to estimate the allocation of such governmental spending
which comes in the form of direct payments, and those, clearly, only account for a marginal
fraction of total spending.8 Looking at the allocation of direct payments, however, may be
illuminative nonetheless as few welfare measures may be better targeted. In addition to
information on direct payments,9 the IES also provides data on the free provision of water,
electricity, and sanitation as well as on grants given for educational purposes.
Table 1. Public Expenditure by Income Decile
Selective distributions of governmental revenue, IES 2011
Income Deciles
Type of Spending 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Weight
Social pension 2.2 9.9 12.6 15.9 16.1 14.6 12.3 8.7 5.0 2.6 0.95
Public education grants 12.6 2.1 3.3 2.9 10.4 6.2 7.7 12.4 21.0 21.5 0.03
Water, sanitation, electricity 12.2 8.8 10.1 10.0 9.0 10.7 11.8 12.2 8.7 6.5 0.02
Total (weighted) 2.7 9.6 12.3 15.4 15.8 14.3 12.2 8.9 5.6 3.2
Note: The table presents the allocation of governmental expenditure to income deciles for three categories of household
income and is based on the IES 2011. The weights are proportional to total expenditure for each type.
Table 1 summarizes the allocation of governmental spending per income decile. The
last row presents an average (which will later be referred to as the derived distribution)
by using total spending in each group as a weight. If all deciles of society would profit
in the same way from governmental spending, the distribution was uniform with 10% of
total expenditure going to each decile. However, the table clearly conveys that this is not
the case. While spending for social protection tends to help the poor, around 56% of total
spending is allocated to the poorer half of society, they are not effective in alleviating the
situation of the poorest. The first decile only receives a marginal fraction of 2.9% of overall
spending and the second decile is, with 9.6%, also comparatively disadvantaged.
8While the relative consumption of education, public transport, roads, health institutions and other
publicly provided goods could in principal be used to allocate administrative costs, arguably accounting for
quite some proportion of total spending, this exercise is out of the scope of this paper.
9This category includes old age pensions, disability grants, family and other allowances, care-dependency
grant, foster care grant, grant in aid, war veteran’s grant as well as other assistance from government
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The amount spent on social pensions, grants, and free water, sanitation, and electricity,
clearly, only accounts for a marginal fraction of total spending (which is briefly discussed
below) and other forms of governmental action could change the distribution of total spend-
ing across income deciles in any form – it may render it more or less progressive or leave it
unchanged. While some components of South Africa’s social system are designed regres-
sively – fees for the use of public institutions, for instance, such as schools and hospitals,
are typically increasing with income – other components, like spending on roads, might
well be progressive.
We lack information on this and assume that all components of governmental spending,
other than those discussed in Table 1, are uniformly distributed across all income deciles.
To account for the fact that this is a very crude approximation to reality, we construct
three distributions of total spending by taking weighted averages of a uniform distribution
and the distribution derived above.
According to the South African Budget Review 2013, around 40% of total revenue was
spent on non-targeted measures, including spending on defence, general public services
(such as international relations and state debt costs), public order and safety, science and
technology and economic affairs. In the following, we take this percentage to be the lower
bound of total expenditure that is distributed uniformly. A markedly larger fraction of
revenue was allocated to social welfare programs including spending on education (20%),
social protection (12%), health care (12%), housing and community amenities (12%), and
social security (4%).
Table 2. Distribution scenarios considered
Distribution scenarios for si
Income Deciles
Public spending scenarios 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Baseline 7.8 9.9 10.7 11.6 11.7 11.3 10.6 9.7 8.7 8.0
Disadvantaged 5.6 9.8 11.4 13.2 13.5 12.6 11.3 9.3 7.3 5.9
Uniform 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Note: The table presents the hypothesised allocation of total governmental expenditure and is constructed by taking
weighted averages between the distribution presented in Table 1 and a uniform distributions. The weights on the
uniform are: 0.7, 0.4, and 1
Spending for social protection and the free provision of water, electricity and sanitation
accounts for approximately 14% of total spending. However, as some forms of public
spending might further add to the progressivity observed in the lower deciles, we attach,
in a baseline scenario, a weight of 0.3 to the distribution derived above. This implies that
around 8% of total revenue is allocated to the first decile of the income distribution. In
a second, more pessimistic scenario, we assume that all revenue spent on social welfare
programs, that is 60% of total spending, follows the observed distribution so that only
5.6% of tax collections are redistributed to the 1st income decile. In a third scenario, we
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Figure 1. Relative Consumption of selected items
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Note: The figure shows relative consumption of selected commodities by income decile. Estimates are based on the
IES 2011 and own calculations.
consider the hypothetical benchmark of a uniform distribution. Table 2 summarises these
scenarios.
3.2. Welfare effects of taxing zero-rated commodities. To get an intuition for the
results presented in the following, we first discuss some illustrative examples of consump-
tion patterns. Figure 1 depicts the relative consumption of citrus fruits, rice, and dried
beans – all zero-rated commodities – by income deciles. The figure clearly conveys two mes-
sages: First, not all zero-rated commodities are inferior goods whose relative consumption
decreases with income. And second, the relative share of VAT-exempt consumption, mea-
sured as the fraction of commodities purchased in the informal sector,10 seems to decreases
with income.
This latter observation is statistically underpinned in Table 3, where the share of VAT-
exempt consumption is regressed on the income decile (and its square) for three subsets
of commodities: all commodities, zero-rated commodities, and fruits – which are also
zero-rated. The first two columns show that around 4% of the 1st income decile’s overall
consumption value is generated in the informal sector. Although this fraction decreases
10This includes street trading and other types of retailers which are not part of the formal sector
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only slightly with income (0.4% per decile), it does so significantly.11 The share of informal
sector activity is higher for zero-rated commodities and fruits. Fruits are (in the quadratic
specification) estimated to have an informal sector share of around 21% in the first and
0% in the 10th decile. Importantly, all (linear) specifications confirm that the reliance on
the informal sector is monotonically, and significantly, decreasing with income.
Table 3. VAT-exempt purchases per income decile
Weighted Least Squares Regression
Dependent: Share of VAT-exempt purchases
Sample All commodities Zero-rated Fruits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.164*** 0.135*** 0.263*** 0.207***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.006) (0.025) (0.016)
Decile -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.012*** 0.010* -0.023** 0.021*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009)
Squared Decile 0.000** -0.003*** -0.005**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adj. R2 0.97 0.99 0.74 0.97 0.67 0.93
Note: Observational unit is the income decile. Weight corresponds to number of households per income decile. Decile
is defined as income decile minus one. The intercept therefore gives mean of 1st decile.
This observation has important implications for the taxation of zero-rated commodities.
To see this, neglect for the moment indirect revenue effects and assume that the first
income decile receives a lower than average fraction, say 9%, of total revenue in the form
of lump-sum transfers. If society’s objective is to maximise the welfare of the poorest,
commodities should not be taxed when the poor’s share in VAT revenue is bigger than 9%.
While South Africa’s first decile consumes around 9.2% of all dried-beans traded, it only
contributes 8.6% of total VAT-revenue; for 13% are purchased in the informal sector and
this fraction is zero for the wealthiest. In this simplistic scenario, dried beans should thus
be taxed (at least marginally) and relying on consumption statistics alone would misguide
policy. Furthermore, note that the estimates for the 1st decile’s share in total revenue used
are lower bounds if the poor tend to buy from retailers who are below the threshold for
VAT-registration.
Table 4 summarises the effect a marginal tax on currently zero-rated commodities had
on the welfare of the first income decile. Columns (1) to (3) report the effect under the
assumption that 7.8% of total revenue is allocated to the first income decile, Columns (4)
to (6) asses the partial reform hypothesising that only 5.6% is distributed to the poor
and Columns (7) to (9) report the corresponding effect for a uniform distribution. Each
distribution scenario is evaluated for negative (Γ = 0.8), neutral (Γ = 1), and positive
11The squared term in Column (2) does not change the main conclusion from the linear specification
and is only presented for completeness.
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Table 4. Welfare effects of taxing zero-rated commodities for South Africa’s 1st income decile
If W ij (Γ, s
1) > 0, table gives 1, otherwise 0
Share allocated to 1st decile (s1) 7.8% 5.6% 10.0%
Indirect revenue effect (Γ) 0.8 1 1.2 0.8 1 1.2 0.8 1 1.2
# Commodity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 brown bread 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
2 rice 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
3 mealierice 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 dried beans 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
5 milk 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 vegoil 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
7 eggs 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
8 citrusfruits 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 normalfruits 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10 stonefruits 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
11 berries 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 tropicalfruit 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
13 driedfruits 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 nuts 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 cannedfruit 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
16 freshveg 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
17 frozenveg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
18 onioncarrot 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
19 driedveg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
20 cannedveg 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
21 otherveg 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
Table reports welfare effects for the 1st income decile as a function (see equation (3)) of their share of public revenue
received (s1) and indirect income effects (Γ). Column (1)-(3) gives baseline scenario, (4)-(6) the disadvantaged
scenario and (7)-(9) the uniform distribution scenario. Entries with a 1 indicate that taxing the respective commodity
would be beneficial for the poorest.
(Γ = 1.2) indirect revenue effects and lump-sum transfers are implicitly assumed for all
cases.
What strikes out is that even under the most disadvantageous conditions considered, the
first decile of South Africa’s income distribution would profit from the taxation of fruits
and nuts (rows number 9 − 16). Given the distribution of (VAT-inclusive) fruit and nut
consumption, this result is obvious: The top decile contributes 35% of total VAT-revenue
collected, the 9th decile around 20% (which is the same as the combined fruit and nuts
revenue collected from the poorer half of South Africa’s society) and the first quintile
merely accounts for 6%.
A similar but somewhat weaker conclusion holds for the taxation of vegetables (rows
number 17 − 20). The baseline scenario indicates that the 1st decile would gain from a
general taxation of vegetables, excluding lentils and dried beans. This result is also quite
robust. Even if only 5.6% of the gain in revenue were redistributed to the poor and indirect
revenue effects were neutral, the poor would still gain from a small VAT on vegetables.
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However, the analysis also reveals that the zero-rating of some commodities effectively
helps the poor. In particular, the 1st income decile’s consumption share of mealie rice, rice,
brown bread, vegetable oil, and dried beans is too big, to compensate the income loss, due
to a marginal tax on these items, by public spending – at least under the distribution and
indirect revenue scenarios considered. The question remains who benefits from not taxing
the other items?
This question is addressed in Table 5, showing the welfare effects of taxing some zero-
rated commodity for the whole income distribution. To simplify the presentation, results
are only reported for the baseline distribution scenario and under the assumption that
revenue effects are neutral. The table conveys that around 70% of South Africa’s population
could gain from taxing fruits and nuts and only the wealthiest 30% would choose not to
introduce a tax. For vegetables, the result is – with the exception of dried vegetables –
alike: the first seven deciles could profit from introducing a tax. The zero-rating of brown
bread, milk and eggs contributes to the well-being of the richer half of South Africa’s
society.
Table 5. Welfare effects of taxing zero-rated commodities for all income deciles
If W ij (1, s
i) > 0, table gives 1, otherwise 0
Income Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
# Commodity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1 brown bread 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 rice 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
3 mealierice 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
4 dried beans 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
5 milk 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
6 vegoil 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
7 eggs 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
8 citrusfruits 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
9 normalfruits 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
10 stonefruits 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
11 berries 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
12 tropicalfruit 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
13 driedfruits 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
14 nuts 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
15 cannedfruit 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
16 freshveg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
17 frozenveg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
18 onioncarrot 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
19 driedveg 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
20 cannedveg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
21 otherveg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Table reports welfare effects for the all income deciles as a function (see equation (3)) of their share of public revenue
received (si) and assuming indirect income effects are neutral (Γ = 1). For the share received, the baseline scenario
is assumed. Entries with a 1 indicate that taxing the commodity was beneficial for the income decile considered.
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4. Conclusion
The South African economy faces many complex challenges, including high levels of
unemployment, shortcomings in public education, a resource-intensive economy bias, and
drastic income inequality (see South African Budget Review 2013) – according to the
Income and Expenditure Survey 2011, the wealthiest ten percent of society have more
than 50% of total income at their disposition while the 1st decile’s share is only 0.4%.
The governing party recognises that structural reforms are much needed to achieve a more
rapid and sustained growth. However, the implementation of such reforms demand broad
consent, which may be hindered by the inequality the economy faces.
In this paper we employ data of the Income and Expenditure Survey 2011 to evaluate
the effectiveness of zero-rating in alleviating the situation of the poorest.12 In doing so,
we consider both sides of fiscal action: how much the government takes and how much it
gives. We find that only 2.9% of direct payments – a targetable measure, accounting for
around 14% of total revenue – are allocated to the 1st income decile. Lacking information
on other forms of governmental spending, we assume that these are uniformly distributed
across all households and create a hypothesised distribution of total spending by assigning
a range of weights to the two components mentioned.
The main finding of this paper is that the marginal taxation of fruits and, to a lesser
extent, the taxation of vegetables – both of which are currently zero-rated – was beneficial
to the 1st income decile under most scenarios considered. In particular, the taxation of
fruits alleviated the situation of the 1st decile, also, if only 5.6% of total spending were
allocated to their use and revenue collection was rather inefficient (meaning that Rand 1.25
had to be additionally collected in tax to provide Rand 1 of spending). Furthermore, we
find that the zero-rating of some commodities, including brown bread, mealie rice, rice,
dried beans, and vegetable oil, effectively helps the poor.
References
Coady, D. and J. Dre`ze (2002). Commodity taxation and social welfare: The generalized
ramsey rule. International Tax and Public Finance 9 (3), 295–316.
Fourie, F. and A. Owen (1993). Value-added tax and regressivity in south africa. South
African Journal of Economics 61 (4), 308–319.
Go, D. S., M. Kearney, S. Robinson, and K. Thierfelder (2005, August). An analysis of
south africa’s value added tax. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 780106, Social Science Research
Network, Rochester, NY.
Jansen, A., E. Stoltz, and D. Yu (2012). Improving the targeting of zero-rated basic food-
stuffs under value added tax (vat) in south africa – an exploratory analysis. Stellenbosch
Economc Working Papers 07.
Katz, M. M. (Ed.) (1994). Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects
of the tax structure of South Africa. Pretoria: Government Printer.
1221 basic food items are not taxed under the South African VAT-system.
12 SEBASTIAN BEER AND MATTHIAS KASPER
Keen, M. (2013). Targeting, cascading, and indirect tax design. IMF Working Paper 13/57,
International Monetary Fund.
Koker, A. D. and D. Kruger (2002). Commentary. In Value-Added Tax in South Africa,
pp. 1–3.
OECD (2012, November). Consumption Tax Trends 2012. Paris: Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development.
Roeleveld, J. and C. D. Wet (2012). South africa. In T. E. et al. (Ed.), The future of
indirect taxation: recent trends in VAT and GST systems around the world. Kluwer Law
International.
SARS Tax Statistics (2013). A joint publication by the national treasury and south african
revenue service. Technical report.
Appendix A. Derivation of Equation (2)
There are i = 1, . . . H households and j = 1 . . .K commodities traded. Producer prices
are fixed and normalised to one and consumption prices are given by qj = 1 +α
iτj . House-
holds maximise utility U(x, g), with respect to the vector of commodities x and subject
to their budget constraint
∑
qx = I. They take public expenditure gi = siG, allocated
to their use, as given. The solution to this problem are uncompensated demand functions
xij(q1, . . . , qK , g
i), which give the maximised value of utility of individual i as a function
V i(t1, . . . , tK , g
i) = U(xi1(q1, . . . qK , g
i), . . . xK(qi, . . . , qK , gi), g
i) of the tax rates and public
expenditure, which is given by G =
∑∑
αixijτj . Differentiating the value function with
respect to τk and G gives, upon using Roy’s identity,
dV p = −VIxpkαidτk + VgspdG.(4)
The corresponding change in public spending is easily seen to be
dG =
H∑
i=1
αixikdτk +
H∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
αiτj
[
∂xij
∂qik
dτk +
∂xij
∂gi
sidG
]
.
Combining these results and defining φp = Vg/VI , δ = (
∑
αixik)
−1∑∑αiτj∂xij/∂τk,
γ =
∑∑
αiτj∂x
i
j/∂g
i gives equation (2) in the text.
